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The importance of space in diverse 
forms of mobilization is increasingly 
recognized. In the Palestinian 
West Bank, the rising number of 
borders has decreased mobility and 
limited individuals to small local 
spaces, generating new patterns 
of collective action and identity 
where national-oriented organizing 
had been strong. The limitations 
on mobility imposed by the Oslo 
accords have contributed to the 
increasing difficulty of collective 
protest, which, contrary to divide 
and conquer axioms, worked to 
increase, not decrease, violence. 
This occurred due to the removal 
of mass constituencies involved 
in protest while also generating 
competition over leadership. The 
case of Fatah, the Palestinian 
Authority's (PA) dominant faction, 
starkly demonstrates the dynamic 
of fragmentation combined with 
increased violence. 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of place in mobiliza-
tion is increasingly recognized, whether 
constrictions on it or the collapsing of 
space through technological innova-
tions. Movements alter with the change 
in borders and practical capabilities of 
connecting. The hindrance represented 
by geographical space is collapsing 
through information technology, 
facilitating long-distance connections 
in real time. Social movement and ter-
rorist studies note the broadening of 
potential organizing, the ability to com-
municate and link to individuals across 
terrain. While most analyses of space 
focus on the possibilities of globaliza-
tion and the removal of place-bound 
limitations, spatial limitations and the 
determining power oflocality have not 
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disappeared. Particularly in developing countries and areas escaping the 
regulatory arm of the law, local groups are engaged in attempts to defend 
and regulate local space. Territory is fought over in weak and failed states, 
safe havens provide opportunities for violent organizing or corridors of 
passage for terrorists, and ungoverned zones provide new opportunities 
for local authorities. 1 Space is a crucial component in the formation of 
daily struggles, political battles, and violent movements. Potential actors, 
their mobilizing identities, the issues of contention, and the locations of 
mobilization are all contingent on the precise composition of the space 
individuals inhabit. 
What effect does the division of territory have upon a movement that 
had been organized on a larger level of aggregation? In the Palestinian West 
Particularly in developing 
countries and areas 
escaping the regulatory 
arm of the law, local 
groups are engaged in 
attempts to defend and 
regulate local space. 
Bank, increasing borders have decreased 
mobility and limited individuals to small 
local spaces, generating altered patterns 
of collective action and identity in an 
area where national-oriented organizing 
was strong. The limitations on mobil-
ity imposed by the Oslo accords have 
contributed to the increasing difficulty 
of collective protest, which, contrary to 
divide and conquer axioms, worked to 
increase, not decrease, violence. This occurred due to the removal of mass 
constituencies involved in protest and competition over leadership, as non-
state actors became divorced from existing leadership. The case of Fatah, 
the Palestinian Authority's (PA) dominant faction and the main constituent 
of the Palestinian Security Services, starkly demonstrates the dynamic of 
fragmentation combined with militarization and increased violence. 
Insights from social movement theory and organizational studies, 
grounded in space with an appreciation of scale, demonstrate that the 
character of protest varies with the physical, practical ability to mobilize and 
communicate. Contrary to divide and conquer axioms, this can generate 
incentives for increased violence both through local competition and the 
removal of the moderate masses from the protest field. These dynamics 
occur through changes in the people available for protest, the sites of con-
tention, the issues of concern, and the collective identity linked to these 
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people, places, and issues. These geographies of conflict can create new 
incentives for violence. By decreasing the physical possibility to protest by 
removing public spaces, large-scale, collective and largely non-violent action 
was marginalized, and the issues of concern altered from national to specifi-
cally local. Collective identities moved in tandem. Non-violent collective 
action continues to be discussed, debated, and enacted, but the difficulty 
of organizing and the transformation of the dominant issues have pushed 
smaller groups to the forefront. This dynamic holds powerful incentives 
for the use of violence. 
To illustrate these dynamics and the potential for violent protest with 
decreasing levels of aggregation, I focus on Fatah's fragmentation into 
numerous competing groups acting against each other and against their 
own superiors, manifest strongly from 
2000-2007. Concomitantly, the masses so 
active in the first, relatively non-violent, 
intifada, all but disappeared from the 
protest scene. Clearly, multiple variables 
were at work in changing the level and 
nature of collective action in this case, 
however spatial limitations played a key 
but neglected role in divorcing would-be 
Spatial limitations played 
a key but neglected role 
in divorcing would-be 
activists from each other 
and from a national 
leadership. 
activists from each other and from a national leadership. 
Concentrating on the West Bank, I show that Oslo fragmented land and 
increased difficulties of organizing and simple movement. While much has 
been written on this territorial phenomenon, it has not been theoretically 
linked to changes in collective organizing. Land contributed crucially to 
other internal factors affecting the hierarchy of Fatah, including Arafat's 
governing style using expatriate leaders disconnected from the grassroots 
and Israel's targeting of middle-level Fatah leaders. Both these factors 
hindered the ability of Fatah to be a hierarchical controlled organization, 
but the limitations of space placed constraints the level of collective action 
and created incentives for localization in the context of Oslo's numerous 
territorial borders. Localization under certain circumstances can gener-
ate more violence, as local-bound leaders rely upon street credibility for 
their leadership instead of the authority granted by a hierarchy. It is no 
coincidence that where the territory of the Palestinian territories is most 
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contiguous, allowing movement and face-to-face connections, non-state 
actors are most centralized and hierarchical. Barnas in Gaza demonstrates 
this dynamic; the contiguity of land there corresponds to Barnas' ability 
to construct a strong hierarchical leadership. 
The internal organization of non-state actors has been increasingly 
scrutinized and linked to success or failure against various enemies and 
types of confrontation.2 Alongside globalization's promise of potential 
unified organizing across countries, there has been a concomitant trend 
of localization for much of the world. These conclusions extend beyond 
understanding the leadership battle in Fatah and the development of spoil-
ers, providing insight into when movements fragment or centralize, and the 
political implications of the different levels of aggregation for movements 
and groups. 
In this article I first present the argument and outcome linking spatial 
changes to Fatah's fragmentation. To explain this, I combine analyses from 
social movement theory, organizational studies, and terrorism studies, 
focusing on the effects of diminished space for mobilization. The Oslo 
agreements altered the geographic space of the Palestinian territories, set-
ting parameters on the sheer ability to mobilize. Instead of eliminating it, 
decentralized protest entailed a shift in emphasis away from the reliance 
on numbers toward the use of violence. I examine how Oslo changed the 
nature of space for organizing and connecting within and across groups, 
and then demonstrate the progression of independent local leaders and 
the concomitant increase in violent acts starting with the second intifada. 
I conclude with observations on the uses of violence in the Palestinian 
territory that have little to do with the Israelis, and everything to do with 
the internal organization and daily life of protest groups. Absent political 
incorporation and attention to underlying grievances, fragmentation can 
increase incentives for violence through intra-movement competition. 
OSLO, SPACE, AND VIOLENCE 
Between the first and second Palestinian intifadas, the character of oppo-
sition protest changed radically. Where the first intifada was relatively 
non-violent and involved a large swath of society, the second was elitist 
and militarized. The first intifada, starting in December 1987, was a time 
42 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE 
VOL. XXVI NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2009 
FRAGMENTED SPACE AND VIOLENCE IN PALESTINE 
of massive popular organizing involving all sectors of society. Particularly 
evident was the participation of women and children, and Christians as well 
as Muslims. A new mobilizing infrastructure emerged, revolving around 
democratic local committees and a rotating leadership comprised of all the 
political factions. Middle classes and professionals formed tens of thou-
sands of committees to provide everything from education to health care. 
While not strictly non-violent, this intifada was relatively so. Its violence 
was limited to the throwing of stones against the Israeli military within 
the occupied territories. Unarmed civilians were not targets. The main 
weapons were economic: the boycotting oflsraeli commodities and taxes, 
and commercial strikes. Stores closed as 
merchants joined the intifada, refusing to 
open and sell Israeli goods. 3 
Typical explanations attribute the 
militarization of the second intifada to 
spoilers attempting to defeat the Oslo 
peace process, frustration at the failure of 
that process, the dictates ofleaders (Yasser 
Space contributed 
to the internal 
variables responsible 
for fragmenting and 
localizing collective 
action in the Palestinian 
Arafat), and the increased presence of territories. The new 
weapons due to arming the Palestinian organizing forms brought 
police. These analyses do not question about by spatial changes 
the origin of spoiler groups nor do they hold strong incentives 
account for the actual composition of for the use of violent 
violence-uncontrolled competition by tactics. 
groups technically part of the Palestinian 
ruling government but acting against it 
and each other. The effect of Oslo's alteration of Palestinian geography is 
omitted. 
Spatial restrictions and dissection in this case were matched by a cor-
responding fragmentation in organizing by PA's loyalists and employees, 
and the population at large. Space contributed to the internal variables 
responsible for fragmenting and localizing collective action in the Palestin-
ian territories. The new organizing forms brought about by spatial changes 
hold strong incentives for the use of violent tactics. The active cross-class 
opposition from the first intifada withdrew from protest, due to coopta-
tion and the removal of public spaces for contestation. The few remaining 
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activists survived in small locales, leveraging their use of violence against 
their small numbers. The higher the fragmentation, the more independent 
decision-making, abrogation of agreed-upon truces, and internal battles 
for dominance. These battles were often characterized by the use of bold 
military maneuvers to establish and institutionalize a new leadership. 
Oslo's territorial fragmentation created three principal dynamics that 
increased the use of violence. First, the decline in public spaces and abil-
ity to assemble or organize beyond the immediate town left small groups 
in the forefront of the opposition. The democratic masses, so clearly in 
control of the first intifada, largely disappeared from the scene. Some were 
co-opted into the new Palestinian Authority (PA) institutions; others hid 
out in non-governmental organizations, themselves serving to fragment the 
Oslo's territorial 
fragmentation created 
three principal dynamics 
that increased the use of 
violence. 
organizational unity of the opposition.4 
The field was left to a committed minor-
ity. Second, for that committed minority, 
radical decentralization weakened the 
links between members and organiza-
tional hierarchies, decreasing the ability of 
the organization to control and discipline 
members. Members competed with each 
other for leadership and competed with 
other groups for recruits and prestige, demonstrating their abilities through 
violent acts. Third, as a result, some members struck out on their own, 
vying not for leadership of the larger group but establishing themselves on 
the local level as separate independent groups. Again, these new leaders 
established their credibility over potential competitors often through the 
use of exemplary violence. I concentrate on the last two often-neglected 
processes in this article. 
Arafat's governing style, promoting friends and non-local individuals 
into positions of power, contributed to the translation of spatial limitation 
into violent fragmentation through its failure to generate incentives for 
members to feel their futures lay, and their actions judged by reference 
to the national.5 While this contributed to the fragmentation of Fatah, 
the speed and extremity of Fatah's devolution from a national orientation 
into scores of competing local groups, within a few years, each with its 
own new name, demonstrates that more than Arafat's corrupt governance 
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was at work. Rather, land limits contributed to creating new local identi-
ties independent and hostile to their old bosses. After the fragmentation 
of Fatah was already apparent with the start of the second intifada in late 
2000, Israel contributed further in the following years to the process of 
localization by its concerted elimination or detention of middle-level Fatah 
cadres, particularly during the reoccupation ofWest Bank towns in 2002, 
removing precisely those able to bridge the local and the national leader-
ships.6 Indeed, while normally the size of the enemy corresponds to the 
size of the alliance to face it, generating larger groups to match the size 
of the threat, here despite a large Israel and threats common to the entire 
Palestinian territories, groups became local, demonstrating the extent of 
the extra-ordinary variables encouraging localization.7 
LOCAL SPACE AND FRAGMENTED GROUPS 
Geographical space is one element determining group networks and the 
array of constraints and opportunities within which groups form and make 
tactical choices.8 Spatial restrictions decreased radically in many areas with 
the arrival of the national state, allowing a new form of social protest to 
develop the social movement.9 The removal of internal borders and the 
creation of the national state allowed local revolts to become national level 
protest movements based on the abstract identity of citizenship.10 Global 
interconnectedness spurred analysis of movements broadening beyond their 
origins, particularly studies of global social movements and globalization 
resistance.11 Constraints on mobilizing are a less-studied phenomenon. 
Spatial limitations can be a continuing matter of resources and practicality, 
a lack of technology or infrastructure. What of localities that were previ-
ously connected, then became separated from each other? Militarily, such 
fragmentation would presumably lead to a classic "divide and conquer" 
scenario, reducing resistance capabilities. In the current world, with easy 
access to weapons, available techniques, and simple weapon-making equip-
ment, fragmentation can increase incentives for violence through processes 
similar to those of underground and small radical offshoot movements. In 
this case, decentralization resulted in new, independent and unconstrained 
leaders using violence as a main resource in competitive battles. 
Place and locale can determine numbers of people available, potential 
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allies, issues of contention, locations of mobilization, the collective identity 
utilized by a group or movement, and methods of collective action. As 
Tilly states, the processes involved in collective action are always connected 
to space, place, and scale.12 Meanings are derived from daily, lived space, 
which is then tied to collective identity, a necessary component of collective 
action and mobilization. 13 Networks too depend upon personal encounters. 
Networks and the ability to form them can be taken for granted in this 
globalizing world, yet the scope and substance of lived networks form the 
basis for organizing. Face-to-face communication has been instrumental 
in fostering trust and commitment, essentials for both mobilization and 
discipline within an organization.14 Tight networks and friendships, upon 
which hierarchy and a sense of obligation to the movement are built, are 
created and sustained by direct interaction. 15 
New border divisions can reverse the processes of aggregation in social 
movements linked to the development of a national state by decreasing 
numbers of participants and localizing issues and identities. This process 
can occur even where a unified identity and national collective action had 
been present. In social movement terms, spatial factors can alter the scale 
of contention downward, internalizing it at a more local level, or upward, 
externalizing it and broadening the arena of contention, the individuals 
involved, and the collective identity of the group. 16 Collective action that 
began at one level of aggregation moves to another. As the scale of conten-
tious collective action moved to a more local, smaller level of aggregation, 
the pool of potential actors narrows. The ability to put on a large-scale dem-
onstration is integral to social movements. As Sewell states, "The physical 
assembling of large numbers of people into limited spaces is an important 
feature of nearly all forms of contentious politics."17 Additionally, through 
numbers, protesters compensate for their lack of resources. This amassing 
does several things. First, it can compensate for lack of resources. Second, 
it gives the group publicity, and third, it promotes solidarity among the 
group, convincing them that they are indeed part of a cause with large 
numbers of committed members. 18 This affects the group's identity and 
various emotional features of the group's faith in their own ability to achieve 
their goals. Indeed, preventing large numbers of people from gathering 
together has been a main goal of authorities facing protesters. 19 
46 
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change in the number of individuals available for collective action, but to 
the characteristics of the group and its focus. Social movement entrepre-
neurs foster collective identity to generate activism, but they work with 
and enhance senses of identity that are present and relevant. 20 The space 
of movement and daily interaction affect these identities. The local area is 
both a pull and a constraint: issues and personnel available to be mobilized 
become local, while at the same time boundaries set limits on connec-
tions with the larger national community, confining individuals by default 
onto their local space. The local not only limits networks and space, but 
also provides new opportunities for different people. "Spatial constraints 
are turned to advantage in political and 
social struggles and ... such struggles 
can restructure the meaning, uses, and 
strategic valence of space. "21 Within the 
limitations, new actors emerge, including 
local leadership. 
Analysts have begun 
to realize that political 
activism including 
violence is not 
always directed from 
organizations structured 
like states or militaries, 
but can be leaderless and 
New actors can be empowered by 
altering boundaries to the local level. 
While it is common to conceive of ter-
rorism and political violence as led by 
leaders, viewing the phenomenon from independent. 
a top-down perspective, analysts have 
begun to realize that political activism 
including violence is not always directed from organizations structured 
like states or militaries, but can be leaderless and independent. A mix of 
movement and local goals can motivate actions. Local, isolated activists 
have acted against their superiors in line with community judgments of 
the organization as unjust and co-opted.22 Organization theorists along 
with empires and dictators acknowledged the dangers of decentralization 
for enforcing authority. Decentralization in space and authority yields the 
possibility of actors at lower levels of the hierarchy pursuing independent 
paths.23 Organizations spend much time and effort in creating internal unity 
through identity, solidarity, and hierarchy.24 Intermittent connections may 
not be enough to counter the pull of local authorities in this new space of 
daily living. 
Spatial limitations do not necessarily dismantle an existing national 
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identity; purposive techniques can maintain networks and link the local to 
the national, even generating lines of authority as military and government 
agencies have found. Decentralization can be stopped from becoming 
fragmentation through techniques such as career advancement, reporting 
requirements, movement of personnel, and training for a corporate iden-
tity.25 These techniques were missing in Fatah, and the lack of promotion 
or organizational mobility were chief complaints within the organization. 
SIZE AND INCENTIVES FOR VIOLENCE 
Scale is related to incentives for violence. Smaller numbers have been associ-
ated with an increase in the use of violence in social protest.26 Fragmented 
and leaderless groups correspond to increasingly anarchical violence in 
other cases.27 The need to make a big statement remains, and without the 
necessary numbers to communicate such a message, more violent methods 
are used to achieve the desired result. Violence indirectly aids the cause 
through publicity, demonstrating the credibility and commitment of the 
protesters, which adds legitimacy to their cause, recruiting members by 
being the most active organization in the field, keeping members in line 
and committed, and provoking a response which polarizes the sides, forcing 
previously neutral individuals to take a stand.28 With dwindling numbers, 
these goals are achieved through public violence. During Italy's period of 
social activism and terrorism, it was groups lacking resources or an ability 
to engage in organized movement politics that specialized in violence, a 
cheap and available resource not requiring much coordination.29 Likewise, 
limited space itself can decrease orderly protest. 30 
Similarly, underground exclusive groups have a high propensity to use 
anti-civilian violence due to their isolation. 31 Cut off from outside contacts, 
they become trapped within underground "spirals of encapsulation" which 
diminish the potential of outside ideologies, ideas, and individuals to alter 
activists' views. 32 Such isolation or segregation is key to the creation of oppo-
sitional consciousness. For this, autonomous spaces where the movement 
can develop without ties of affection, friendship, or business are necessary 
to promote more radical views that target people the individual would 
otherwise meet in daily interaction. 33 Integration spoils this oppositional 
consciousness. Insulation from alternative opinions or practices has been 
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instrumental in creating loyal members for cults.34 In the extreme, as is 
the case in exclusive and underground organizing, separation promotes 
"anti-system" ideologies, a process that led to violence against civilians in 
Algeria, Hafez argues. 35 The close quarters and difficulty of exit is one case 
where individuals engage in violence they otherwise would not. 36 
The removal of connections to the hierarchy opens the field for poten-
tial leadership battles, in the extreme characterized by a competition of 
one-upmanship. Competition raises the bar for demonstrating an ability to 
implement ever more daring acts. Leaders must "prove" themselves, often 
through a competitive display of violence to solidify leadership. Without a 
hierarchical structure of orderly leadership change, reputation is established 
by dynamics similar to those of gangs and mafias, with a political twist.37 The 
ability to command in this case comes not from a structure of leadership 
but instead from street-won legitimacy. In 
addition to demonstrating physical prow- The removal of 
ess, the would-be leader must be admired as 
a fighter for the cause: he (all men in these 
cases) must be perceived as self-sacrificing, 
risking death or imprisonment, and taking 
action to stand up against the enemy. To 
stay on top, they need to continually prove 
themselves militarily vis-a-vis other local 
groups operating in the same field. These 
battles are often characterized by the use 
connections to the 
hierarchy opens the field 
for potential leadership 
battles, in the extreme 
characterized by a 
competition of one-
upmanship. 
of bold military maneuvers to establish and institutionalize a new leader-
ship. By contrast, the more established the actor, in general, the lower the 
propensity to use unaccepted tactics. 38 
Potential leaders use violence and innovative tactics to win out over 
rivals, as do groups seeking to establish themselves in competition with other 
groups. Bloom details a theory of outbidding to explain suicide terrorism. 
"Where there are multiple groups, violence is a technique to gain credibility 
and win the public relations competition. " 39 Competitive outbidding and 
new forms of violence are more likely where no actor is dominant. The 
increasing number of groups in the Palestinian territories corresponded 
to increases in attacks and in the violence of them. This is demonstrated 
in multiple organizations attempting to claim responsibility for the same 
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bombings.40 Similarly, during Italy's experience of terrorism and violence, 
Della Porta and Tarrow found that competition within a social movement, 
among various groups with similar goals for example, led to high amounts 
of violence. Violent actions are advertisements that distinguish one group 
from the rest. Most violence would be expected when numerous groups 
with like goals exist, all vying for prominence.41 Competition between 
groups within the movement for a social support base resulted in increases 
in violence, pushing the boundaries of the acceptable.42 Uncertainty and 
lack of leadership also cause a rise in violence, as sides become polarized 
and moderates leave the field of activism or take a side.43 
The higher the level of fragmentation, the more independent decision-
making, abrogation of agreed-upon truces, and internal battles for domi-
nance. Thus, divide and conquer does not necessarily decrease violence, 
Divide and conquer does 
not necessarily decrease 
violence, as the axiom 
seems to imply. 
as the axiom seems to imply. Increased 
violence with fragmentation can be due 
to competition that turns on the popular-
ity of the violence with the public, or the 
public's limited levers of control over it. 
With the relevant public constricted to 
small locales, the community may have 
neither the will nor the ability to limit 
violence. The opposition in the West Bank and Gaza has more volunteers 
for suicide operations than it can handle, due to ongoing dissatisfaction with 
the situation.44 According to Maoz, Israeli policies of collective punishment 
rely on the community to rein in the activists. To do this, the populace 
must have the will and capacity to deter the insurgents.45 Policies geared 
to make mobilizing more difficult are based on the premise that the move-
ment is hierarchical, controlled by a leader who "commands" his followers. 
Without the leader, the reasoning goes, the masses would be either unable 
or unwilling to act. Robinson calls this the "microwave" theory of politi-
cal violence. The leader (Arafat in his case) pushes a button, and militancy 
is turned on or off.46 In this case, the difficulty of formal organizing led 
to decentralized and underground activities, not the disappearance of the 
organization as top-down theories would suggest. 
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TRANSFORMING SPACE 
The physical mobility obstacles created through the Oslo accords affected 
the internal structure of protest movements and of Fatah in the Palestin-
ian West Bank, causing non-mobilization by previously active groups and 
fragmentation into numerous competing groups by others. Oslo created 
sweeping changes in the geography of the West Bank and Gaza, parceling 
the territories with crisscrossed checkpoints of control that severely hindered 
and in many cases prohibited movement of persons altogether, limiting 
most to their small towns. Oslo, the name given to the cumulative process 
beginning with the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 between the 
Palestinians and Israel, contained a timetable for withdrawal from the occu-
pied Palestinian territories that was not met. 47 Despite the missed timetables 
for withdrawal, much of Oslo has in fact been implemented. A large portion 
of Oslo focused on geographic changes, and it is these provisions that were 
enacted. Geographic and border control measures were deemed especially 
important for Israeli security by the Israeli military, who had a strong hand 
in crafting the provisions in Oslo II particularly.48 
The Oslo accords reorganized the boundaries of life and mobility for 
Palestinians. Oslo entailed a piecemeal process by which a Palestinian author-
ity would gain partial control over increasingly more land. Fundamental 
to this process is the fragmentation of the territories, the prevention of all 
forms of opposition, and the continued control of exit points by Israel. Oslo 
expanded and institutionalized Israel's supervision of population move-
ments, resulting in what some have termed a "matrix of control" resembling 
an archipelago or Swiss cheese, as a result of economic, bureaucratic, and 
demographic provisions.49 The tiny West Bank, smaller than Delaware, 
was divided into 300 separate areas.50 The accords increased the number 
of borders, checkpoints, and the use of closure or refusing entry for Pal-
estinian workers to Israel. As per Oslo II, all Palestinian borders would be 
with Israel. Borders became internal borders, including exit or entry from 
any areas transferred to the PA. In effect, the occupied territories became 
a patchwork of small isolated areas. 
The relevant aspect of Oslo here was the creation of physical obstacles 
to mobility. The first consequence of Oslo was the inability of previously 
active groups to mobilize and protest. While prohibitions and harsh pen-
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alties for organizing were present in the first intifada, Oslo added a new 
element. It increased the geographic difficulties of convening meetings, 
network, and stage protests. The geographic changes of Oslo have been 
variously termed cantons, enclaves or ghettos.51 Whatever the term, it is 
clear that travel in the West Bank has been made much more difficult and 
often impossible. 
As per Oslo II (1995), three zones of jurisdiction were established 
within the West Bank. The PA came to rule over Area A, both the PA and 
Israel controlled Area B, and Area C was Israel's sole responsibility. The 
By the end of 1999, the 
PA was in control of over 
200 small areas, most 
smaller than one square 
mile .... A Palestinian 
going from one area 
of the PA in the north, 
Jenin, to another in the 
south, Hebron, would 
have to ... pass through 
border crossings 50 
times. 
Israeli military would be redeployed from 
Areas A and be stationed outside them. 
Areas B and C would remain in Israeli 
hands during the initial phases of Oslo. 
Area A autonomous zones were limited 
by the fact of checkpoints upon entrance 
and exit, since all Palestinians are located 
within less than three miles of Area C.52 
By the end of 1999, the PA was in con-
trol of over 200 small areas, most smaller 
than one square mile. Passage to or from 
them is controlled by Israeli military 
checkpoints. Border controls and physical 
barriers, such as trenches, electric fences, 
and barricades of sand, rock, or concrete, 
lie outside each of these areas. Added to 
this, roads in the territories are policed by hundreds of standing and mobile 
checkpoints, the latter termed "flying checkpoints" due to their lack of a 
permanent location.53 Between 2000 and 2004, over 500 new military 
checkpoints have been established;54 an additional over 200 were temporary. 
Almost 60 were established immediately following Oslo. 
One observer notes that a Palestinian going from one area of the PA in 
the north, Jenin, to another in the south, Hebron, would have to change 
zones of authority-and thus pass through border crossings-50 times. 55 
According to another observer, a major consequence of this territorial 
change has been the "theft of time" and the inability to make plans, even 
for work. Costs of travel have skyrocketed, and individuals wait hours and 
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days at roadblocks or waiting to cross borders. Palestinian travelers must 
change transportation an average of every 12 miles. 56 The uncertainty of 
being able to pass through borders and checkpoints prohibited effective 
planning. Permits were not assured and the decisions were unilateral. 
People were not informed in advance whether their application to travel 
would be accepted.57 
In addition to the generation of new internal borders and checkpoints, 
limits on popular mobility included the separation wall, closure and curfews. 
The wall cut off villages not only from Israel but from neighboring Palestin-
ian villages and their own agricultural lands as well. Eighteen communities 
were completely surrounded by the wall. 58 Closure is the limitations imposed 
by Israel on the movement of the Palestinian population and its goods. 
Closure can be internal, within the West Bank and Gaza strip, or external, 
or between those territories and Israel. It can be partial or total. While 
closure pre-dates Oslo and the advent of suicide bombings inside Israel, 
it was institutionalized by the accords and presented as an anti-terrorism 
measure.59 Internal closure is effectively a curfew, preventing movement 
between villages. Closure combines with the pass or permit system, whereby 
even when restrictions are lifted the population needs permission to move 
from place to place.60 Beginning in May 2002, passes lasting one month 
were required for traveling out of or into any of the eight regions of the West 
Bank. Closely linked to closure are curfews. In Areas Band C, remaining 
under Israeli control, curfews were enacted throughout the Oslo process. 
Further, if the PA was deemed lacking in meeting Israel's security concerns, 
Area A could, and has, come under curfew also; towns in Area A were re-
occupied in 2002. Closure policies furthered the decline of mass activism 
through increasing poverty, by withdrawing income from work in Israel. 
Poverty rates are now estimated at 60 percent and 80 percent for West 
Bankers and Gazans respectively.61 Contrary to the crowd theories of old, 
the poor have less time and resources to mobilize.62 
Settlements increased during Oslo, which also created internal bor-
ders and necessitated bypass roads to connect to Israel.63 Land devoted to 
settlements increased substantially. Israeli settlements increased by over 50 
percent during the seven years between Oslo and the second intifada, and 
the settler population almost doubled. 64 Further bisecting the territories 
is a grid of bypass roads, linking the settlements to Israel but insulating 
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them from the surrounding Palestinian population. Unlike the Palestinian 
traveler mentioned above, Israelis travel freely throughout the territories 
via bypass roads such as the Trans-Israel Highway, without ever changing 
zones or being held up at a checkpoint. These highways take up a width of 
three to four football fields, including the highway and the isolated fenced 
zones surrounding them. 65 As of 2004, 250 miles of settlement road had 
been built and three major highways, all prohibited from Palestinian use 
and bisecting the territories.66 
The substance of spaces available for protest altered as well. Israeli sol-
diers moved from inside towns to controlling the town's entrance and exit. 
Further, roads that were a forum for disruptive protest in the first intifada, 
Unlike the Palestinian 
traveler mentioned 
above, Israelis travel 
freely throughout the 
territories via bypass 
roads such as the Trans-
Israel Highway, without 
ever changing zones 
or being held up at a 
checkpoint. 
are now officially controlled by the Israeli 
military per Oslo. Due to the parallel set 
of roads for Israeli settlers, Palestinian 
roadblocks achieve nothing. Disappearing 
public space has been replaced by isolated 
and contained places of confrontation, 
usually internal borders. Checkpoints and 
border crossings became the main site of 
confrontation with Israeli soldiers.67 
Though logistically difficult, mass-
based demonstrations did occur, but their 
effect and publicity were limited. Thou-
sands of Palestinian political prisoners on 
a hunger strike similarly found their effort did not seem to warrant media 
coverage or attention to the conditions they were protesting. An Israeli 
official likened the hunger strike to terror, saying he would not give in to 
their demands. Explicitly in reference to the lack of attention to this non-
violent action, armed groups declared their desire to kidnap soldiers and 
settlers to promote the prisoners' demands. A Palestinian demonstration 
against the wall, uniting Palestinians with Americans and Israeli Jews, was 
greeted by live fire in which both an American and an Israeli were wounded. 
Another non-violent demonstration, declared free of weapons by Amnesty 
International, was held to draw attention to the plight of a refugee camp 
under curfew. Tanks shelled the demonstration, killing eight.68 
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Generally, the media neither report disruptive, non-violent protests nor 
do their participants escape (Israeli) military or (Palestinian) police action. 
The widespread opinion is that non-violent protest, while desirable in 
theory, will be met by violence.69 This opinion is backed by experience, as 
the PA and Israel have both confronted non-violent demonstrations with 
lethal force. Advocates and organizers of non-violent activities end up in 
jail alongside those engaging in violence, even members of organizations 
uniting Israeli Jews and Palestinians. A leader of one such joint demonstra-
tion was placed under administrative detention since he was embarking on 
an "unhappy" path according to authorities. 70 Such repression adds to the 
practical difficulties of organizing to the detriment of activism attracting 
large groups. 
FROM RULING ORGANIZATION TO MULTIPLE 
COMPETING MOVEMENTS 
Arafat's movement Fatah, the main constituent of the governing PA, domi-
nated the government at the start of the Oslo Accords. This first intifada 
created a new leadership infrastructure in the territories. To govern, Arafat 
relied heavily on his own PLO faction, Fatah, leaders from abroad, notable 
families, cooptation through corruption, and personal micro-management. 
He tapped a new source of support, the old landed elite families or notables, 
reviving reliance on family and tribes where it had been marginalized.71 
Fatah dominated the new PA security forces, which by 1997 totaled over 
40,000.72 
From Oslo in 1993 to the start of the second intifada in 2000, violence 
was mainly a tactic used by the Islamist groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
By 2000, the situation changed: it was the secular groups-Fatah and its 
offshoots-that were deemed the larger security threat by Israel.73 Among 
these groups was the Tanzim (the Organization), the group from which 
much of the new violent groups sprang. The Tanzim was made up largely 
graduates of the first intifada who represented the internal leadership aligned 
with Arafat, and was possibly formed by Arafat to counter the attractiveness 
of the Islamist militias. 74 
While during the initial Oslo years these groups followed the PA's 
orders and battled the Islamists, by the start of the intifada many joined 
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with the Islamic opposition in their operations and refused orders from 
their superiors. Many then formed the unofficial al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade 
(AMB ), fought Israeli military forces often against direct orders from the 
PA, split into numerous additional groups, and began using the tactic of 
suicide bombing against civilians. Given the resulting fragmentation, some 
analysts questioned the loyalty of these forces to PA commands from the 
start.75 Yet something had clearly changed. At the beginning of Oslo, Fatah 
and the Palestinian Police were able to effectively rein in dissenters. By the 
start of the second intifada, discipline no longer worked.76 Other observers 
initially posited that the groups were acting on orders from Arafat, until 
attacks on Arafat's close allies and the PA proliferated. The groups refused 
While previously 
violence followed a clear 
pattern of tit-for-tat 
retaliation, apparent to 
close observers, the use 
of violence now seemed 
random. Analysts began 
calling the violence 
"laissez-faire," a free-for-
all, anarchy, and chaos. 
Arafat's orders for them to dissolve.77 
As the fragmentation increased, 
analysts recognized the depth of the 
qualitative change in Fatah linked to 
spatial borders and competition.78 "The 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip have been 
divided into approximately 10 separate 
territorial units that maintain semi-inde-
pendent micro-political/economic envi-
ronments bearing little accountability to 
central Palestinian governance in Ramal-
lah," according to one conflict observer 
group.79 The PA had no real authority, 
leaders were local, and there was no uniformity across cities in the terri-
tories, according to the International Crisis Group.8° Competition within 
Fatah has been responsible for the generation of splinter groups, another 
stated.81 Such fragmentation was attributed to policies ofisolation.82 While 
previously violence followed a clear pattern of tit-for-tat retaliation, apparent 
to close observers, the use of violence now seemed random. Analysts began 
calling the violence "laissez-faire," a free-for-all, anarchy, and chaos.83 The 
PA leadership complained about the splinter groups, calling them wanted 
men and rebellious armed gangs.84 Fatah had become local militias, and 
internal power struggles led some to seek sponsorship abroad, a dynamic 
that would theoretically increase public violence, according to Bloom. 85 
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enemy, Hamas, but against each other, dominated many West Bank cities. 
The extent of the fragmentation and competing groups was demonstrated 
in the development of distinct identities linked to local place, apparent in 
the generation of new names for the small groups, the use of their own 
flags in place of the Palestinian one, and their own self-promoting parades.86 
While collectively they are known as al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AMB ), in 
fact within this general classification are numerous groups each with their 
own name: the Battalions of the Return, Jenin Martyr's Brigade, Forces of 
U mar al-Mukhtar, Jerusalem Brigades, Forces of Badr, Brigades of Black 
Oslo, Salah ad-Din Brigades, and the Harbinger (al-Nathir), among oth-
ers. The cities of Nablus and Jenin were early independent actors, despite 
Nablus having been a Fatah stronghold.87 
These independent groups used increasing violence, extending into 
what had been the purview of the Islamist groups, suicide bombing.88 
Israeli sources attributed Fatah-affiliated groups with half of all attacks 
against Israel in 2002.89 These "splinter groups" had become more of a 
source of terrorism than Hamas, when foiled attempts are included.90 The 
various groups also engaged in joint operations with Islamist groups.91 The 
populace viewed these groups as thugs or gangs; one prominent leader was 
known as the knee-capper.92 
Brigade members have established themselves first as local leaders, then 
as independent of Fatah command, particularly in northern West Bank 
towns that are isolated from each other including Nablus, Jenin, Qalquiliyya 
and Tulkaram. The localization of leadership is illustrated in the Brigade 
leader ofJenin, Zakariya Zubeidi. Beginning as a peace activist, he became 
the unofficial mayor of Jenin, independent of PA authority. His group has 
attacked and kidnapped PA officials and their offices on numerous occasions. 
One governor was given a public beating for his alleged corruption. The 
role of violence in consolidating the chain of leadership is clear. Two days 
after assuming the reigns of authority, he authorized a suicide bombing in 
Israel.93 Arafat repeatedly tried to convince Zubeidi to become a loyal Fatah 
member, to no avail. In 2004, amidst growing popular approval for suicide 
attacks and multiple competing power claims by opposition groups in the 
northern area around J enin, Zubeidi decided to re-commence suicide acts 
within Israel against the PA's wishes.94 Even sending money would not buy 
Zubeidi's loyalty to the PA; he took the money but refused to comply.95 
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In other locations, fights for dominance continued without the effec-
tive establishment of local authority. Nablus has been called as "a factory 
for suicide bombers," despite its isolation by at least eight checkpoints.96 
Several factions within AMB vie for dominance here, the source of most 
violence. Wars for "turf'' are within the secular, Fatah-aligned groups, not 
between them and the Islamists.97 In one scandal, children were unof-
ficially being recruited for suicide operations, against the local Brigades 
leader's orders. After he was killed, the recruiting continued, and parents 
complained that he had been the only one able to control the numerous 
fighters.98 Fragmentation led to acts against the leadership's decisions and 
to competitive violence or outbidding. In another area, when one leader in 
AMB stopped shooting into a border settlement, his competitor rejected 
PA officials were 
targets of these groups. 
Even individuals close 
to Arafat have been 
attacked, killed, or 
kidnapped. 
the order and continued the violence with 
his own faction. In other cases, orders 
against terrorist attacks inside Israel were 
simply ignored.99 
PA officials were targets of these 
groups. Even individuals close to Arafat 
have been attacked, killed, or kidnapped. 
The PA's interior minister was threat-
ened in Nablus, the cars of the town's 
governor set on fire and his brother kidnapped. 100 The Gaza police chief 
was kidnapped. 101 The home of a PA police officer was set on fire, while a 
hundred other policemen stood across the street .102 Foreigners were seized, 
diplomats attacked, and Arafat aides and officials were abducted, fired upon, 
or killed. 103 These attacks included the PA Minster of the Interior, who was 
threatened and banned from Nablus for his disavowal of AMB bombing 
attacks. 104 Individuals calling themselves the Abu Ammar (Arafat's nom 
de guerre) brigades fired on Mahmud Abbas, the president after Arafat, in 
Arafat's mourning tent. 105 PA offices, institutions, and journalists have been 
attacked. The governor of Jenin's office was sacked, and his predecessor 
kidnapped and publicly tried in the streets.106 
The loss of centralized control has made truces or peace treaties increas-
ingly difficult. Local leaders stated that they were not consulted, despite 
their alleged superiors having agreed to the truce. 107 Truces accepted by the 
other oppositions, including the Islamists, have been ignored and violated 
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by the Brigade. Decisions by the Fatah Revolutionary Council could not 
be enforced. 108 In many cases, it was unclear who was responsible for the 
actions.109 Against strict PA orders for calm before the hearing at the Inter-
national Court ofJustice in the Hague on the legitimacy of the separation 
wall, one of these AMB groups carried out a bombing, a complete public 
relations embarrassment. no 
The process of organizational splintering accelerated following Israel's 
re-occupation of West Bank towns in spring 2002. Still, the first suicide 
bombing inside Israel mounted solely by a group from the secular AMB, 
without Islamist collaboration, occurred before that, in January. Israel assas-
sinated over one hundred political activists, both religious and secular during 
the first two years of this intifada. Ill The 
2002 Israeli reoccupation of West Bank The loss of centralized 
towns wiped out or imprisoned much of control has made 
Fatah's middle rank leadership, who were 
replaced by young leaders increasingly 
autonomous of any hierarchy or control. 
In fact, following leadership assassinations 
and major Israeli military operations, the 
level of violence and disparate nature of 
the groups increased where those groups 
were territorially isolated. n 2 
The case of Ham as, the most repressed 
truces or peace treaties 
increasingly difficult. 
Local leaders stated that 
they were not consulted, 
despite their alleged 
superiors having agreed 
to the truce. 
of the opposition, illustrates the crucial role of space even as leadership was 
eliminated. Despite repeated round-ups of suspected members, raids and 
closures of its mosques, social and educational service institutions in the 
mid- l 990s, Hamas recovered from temporary fragmentation largely due to 
its unified territorial space in Gaza-known as "Hamasland."n3 Observers 
credited Hamas with maintaining discipline, even being capable ofrestrain-
ing its followers from revenge or independent operations. n4 
Fatah's fragmentation reached its height in 2005. While at the start of 
the uprising Arafat indeed approved or ignored much of the violence, by 
2001-02 he and the PA made concerted attempts to stop it and reign in 
the splinter groups.m Security crackdowns were unsuccessful. 116 Hamas' 
electoral win in 2006 changed that. In 2007, much effort, troops, and funds 
were devoted to regaining control, and now with the emergence of this 
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larger, unifying threat-Hamas in charge of the PA-the efforts seemed to 
bear fruit at least temporarily.117 Indeed, external enemies should promote 
centralization and alliances, however this dynamic curiously did not result 
from the threat posed by Israel. Despite the renewed efforts at discipline 
in Fatah, the fundamental problem of localization remains a distinct pos-
sibility, generating independent authorities and identities at smaller levels 
of aggregation than the national, virtually unconstrained. 
CONCLUSION 
Space can be one determinant of organizational form, which in turn is 
related to the choice of group tactics. Space is tied to the place and possibili-
ties of mobilization, issues and grievances, and the potential constituency of 
collective action. The episode of Fatah's fragmentation demonstrated the 
quickness with which local leaders can be divorced from national leader-
ship, and the effect in this process of spatial borders in altering leaderships, 
identities, and issues. The new geographic reality of Oslo made movement 
difficult, effectively confining many to their hometown, mainly through 
checkpoints marking passages from one authority to another every few 
miles. Observers continually referenced the role of isolation and closed 
spaces in refusing orders and generating new leaderships. Other factors 
played a role, namely, Fatah's unchanging and corrupt leadership and Israel's 
elimination of mid-level Fatah personnel. However, land borders set the 
stage for Fatah's dismantling of existing hierarchies, its rapid and extreme 
fragmentation, and its easy generation of diverse groups and identity. The 
situation was only countered by the advent of a viable threat to all Fatah 
in the form of Hamas' electoral win. 
Divide and conquer is an age-old strategy for defeating an enemy. For 
insurgencies or movements with grass-roots support, fragmentation, in 
today's world with easy weaponry and technology, holds the potential to 
further militarize and prolong the conflict. Fragmented territory can gen-
erate a crisis and competition over leadership. Instead of decreasing the 
violence, territorial fragmentation and the difficulty of formal organizing 
led to decentralized and underground activities, not to the disappearance 
of the organization as top-down theories of opposition would suggest. 
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